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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade, China has been the world’s leading supplier of
active pharmaceutical ingredients (“APIs”).1 Today, it is not only the world’s
* Copyright © 2020 Peter K. Yu. Professor of Law, Professor of Communication, and Director, Center for Law
and Intellectual Property, Texas A&M University. Earlier versions of this Article were presented at the
“Changing Regulation of Pharmaceuticals: Pricing, Intellectual Property, Trade and Ethics” Symposium at the
University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, as a keynote address at the 11th Conference of the United
States–China Intellectual Property Institute hosted by the Faculty of Law of the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, and at the Webinar on “China’s Changing Role in the Global Pharmaceutical System: Implications for
National and Global Public Health” organized by the Global Health Centre at the Graduate Institute of Geneva.
The Author is grateful to Albert Wai-Kit Chan, Christopher Holman, Lee Jyh-an, Michael Mireles, and Suerie
Moon for their kind invitations and Frederick Abbott and other event participants for their valuable comments
and suggestions.
1. See Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED.
345, 363 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines] (“[China] already is the world’s largest producer of
active pharmaceutical ingredients and is likely to be a very important player in the generic market.”); see also
WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], CHINA POLICIES TO PROMOTE LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL
PRODUCTS
AND
PROTECT
PUBLIC
HEALTH
17
(2017),
https://www.who.int/phi/publications/2081China020517.pdf [hereinafter WHO CHINA STUDY] (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (prepared by Frederick Abbott) (“China is the world’s leading producer
and exporter of [APIs] by volume, accounting for 20% of total global API output. China produces over 2000
API drug products, with annual production capacity exceeding 2 million tons.” (footnote omitted)). See
generally id. at 17–18 (discussing China’s production and export of APIs).
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second largest pharmaceutical market, behind only the United States,2 but it also
produces about four percent of the world’s new pharmaceutical products.3
Despite these impressive accomplishments, China does not have internationally
recognized pharmaceutical brands that are comparable to those found in Europe
or the United States, such as Johnson & Johnson, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche,
and Sanofi.4 Nor does China rival India in its status as the “pharmacy of the
world,”5 providing generic drugs to needy countries from around the world,6
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa.7
Since the mid-2000s, China has taken an innovative turn that has serious
ramifications for the global pharmaceutical landscape and future developments at
the intersection of intellectual property and public health. To be sure, many
policymakers and commentators still focus unduly on the problems in the
Chinese intellectual property system.8 Notable examples from the past few years
2. See Issaku Harada, China Extends Drug Patents to 25 Years, NIKKEI ASIAN REV. (May 16, 2018),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/China-extends-drug-patents-to-25-years (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“China’s pharmaceutical market is now worth more than $120 billion, second only to
America’s.”).
3. See CHINA PHARM. ENTERS. ASS’N ET AL., FOSTERING A SUSTAINABLE ECOSYSTEM FOR DRUG
INNOVATION IN CHINA 3 (2016), http://enadmin.rdpac.org/upload/upload_file/1577873373.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Measured by the number of pipeline drugs and new drugs launched,
China is in the third tier, contributing around 4% to global drug innovations, lagging far behind the first tier[,]
the US (~50%)[,] and countries in the second tier such as the UK and Japan.”); Ma Huateng, Tencent,
Application of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data in China’s Healthcare Services, in GLOBAL INNOVATION
INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY LIVES—THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 103, 108 (Soumitra Dutta et
al. eds., 2019) [hereinafter GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019] (“China has independently researched and
developed new drugs in recent years that have contributed about 4% to the global novel drug market,
approximately one-twelfth of the contribution from that of the United States of America.”).
4. See Michael Christel, Pharm Exec’s Top 50 Companies 2019, PHARMACEUTICAL EXECUTIVE (July 12,
2019), http://www.pharmexec.com/pharm-execs-top-50-companies-2019 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (listing the top 50 global biopharma players in 2019 based on drug sales); The Top Ten
Pharmaceutical Companies by Market Share in 2018, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/top-pharmaceutical-companies/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing the top ten pharmaceutical companies in 2018 based on market
share).
5. See Shamnad Basheer & Pankhuri Agarwal, India’s New IP Policy: A Bare Act?, 13 INDIAN J.L. &
TECH. 1, 22 (2017) (noting that the Indian pharmaceutical industry has earned the moniker “pharmacy of the
world”).
6. See KAMAL NATH, INDIA’S CENTURY 110 (2008) (noting that India “makes more than a fifth of the
world’s generic drugs”); Kenneth C. Shadlen, Is AIDS Treatment Sustainable?, in THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
OF HIV/AIDS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 29, 36 (Obijiofor Aginam,
John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., 2013) (“It is estimated that more than half of those receiving AIDS
treatment in the developing world are treated with generic [antiretrovirals] produced in India.”).
7. See Colleen V. Chien, HIV/AIDS Drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and Generic Supply
Compare?, 2 PLOS ONE e278, 2 (2007) (stating that India provided eighty-five percent of generic HIV/AIDS
antiretrovirals in Sub-Saharan Africa).
8. For the Author’s earlier discussions of the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China, see generally
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS
ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to
Partners I]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO
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included the Trump administration’s Section 301 reports9 and the United States’
second complaint against China10 for violating the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”) of the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”).11 Nevertheless, it is time that policymakers and
commentators paid greater attention to the changing Chinese pharmaceutical
landscape and its many ramifications.
Part II recounts China’s innovative turn, tracing the developments back to the
mid-2000s when Chinese leaders began to make a major policy push toward the
development of independent innovation. Part III examines the changing
pharmaceutical landscape in China, drawing illustrations from the recently
proposed amendments to Chinese patent law and pharmaceutical regulations. Part
IV explores the ramifications of China’s increasing assertiveness in the
pharmaceutical arena, at both the domestic and global levels. Specifically, this
Part discusses three sets of ramifications: the changing discourse on intellectual
property developments in China, the internal challenges that confront the country
at this time of policy transition, and the global complications that will affect the
future development of the international trading and intellectual property systems.
II. CHINA’S INNOVATIVE TURN
Although China has a longstanding history of innovation,12 including medical

China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, The Middle
Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011).
9. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S
ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018) [hereinafter SECTION 301
INVESTIGATION REPORT] (providing the final report of the investigation); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, UPDATE CONCERNING CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION (2018) (providing an update to the earlier report).
10. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Second TRIPS
Complaint] (providing the complaint). Although the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel in
November 2018, it has since suspended the panel proceedings at the United States’ request. See China—Certain
Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/10 (June 14, 2019)
(requesting the suspension of the WTO panel proceedings). The first complaint the United States filed against
China is China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights. Panel
Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc.
WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009); see also Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV.
1046 (2011) (discussing this dispute); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011) (same).
11. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
12. For discussions of scientific developments in China, see generally BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, ON THEIR
OWN TERMS: SCIENCE IN CHINA, 1550–1900 (2005); JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA
(1956–2004); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF CHINA: 3,000 YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY & INVENTION
(2007).
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innovations13—and it adopted a patent law in 191214 and another in 194415—it
did not establish a modern patent system until its economy reopened to the
outside world in the late 1970s.16 In 1984, China established the Patent Law,
reviving the protection that inventions had once enjoyed.17 Except for a brief
period from 1950 to 1954, during which patents were granted in the then-newly
founded People’s Republic of China, inventors obtained protection through
inventors’ certificates (faming zhengshu) and other types of awards or
remuneration.18 A few months after the adoption of the 1984 Patent Law, China
acceded to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,19 which
took effect in the country on March 19, 1985.20
13. As one commentator observed:
The Yellow Emperor’s Classic provides the first recorded evidence of widespread use of [traditional
Chinese medicine] in mainland China. This ancient text, written prior to 85 B.C., details traditional
methods of diagnosis and treatment. Later written examples of traditional diagnosis and healing
testify to China’s rich medical history, as well as to some correlation between the basic theories and
products used for treatment.
Teresa Schroeder, Comment, Chinese Regulation of Traditional Chinese Medicine in the Modern World: Can
the Chinese Effectively Profit from One of Their Most Valuable Cultural Resources, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
687, 689 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
14. See Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder: Three Decades of Development of the Chinese Patent System,
5 WIPO J. 1, 4 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Building the Ladder] (“China introduced a substantive patent law in
1912, the year after the fall of the last imperial dynasty in China. Titled the Provisional Regulations on Awards
for Devices (Creations), the law offered foreign patent owners very limited protection despite what it stated on
paper.”).
15. See id. (“Although a new patent law was finally introduced in 1944, shortly before the end of the
Second World War, the patent system never took off in mainland China following Guomindang’s retreat to
Taiwan. That system eventually became the Taiwanese patent system.”).
16. See generally IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 858–69 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing
China’s adoption of the Open-Door Policy in December 1978, which provided “a complete reversal of the
Maoist policy of seclusion that had been in force . . . between 1958 and 1978”).
17. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) (China) [hereinafter 1984 Patent Law].
18. Immediately after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, patent protection was
retained in the Provisional Regulations Governing Invention and Patent Rights, which was adopted in 1950 and
also covered inventors’ certificates. Pursuant to these regulations, the first Chinese patent issued to the inventor
of a soda-making process. ZHENG CHENGSI WITH MICHAEL D. PENDLETON, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW 52 (1987). Nevertheless, patents were quickly phased out, and emphasis
had shifted toward other types of awards or remuneration in the next three decades:
[The 1950] regulations were quickly modified in 1954 with the enactment of the Provisional
Regulations Concerning Awards for Inventions with Regard to Products, Technical Improvements
and Rationalisation Proposals. Between 1950 and 1963, “only four patents and six inventor
certificates were granted”. In December 1963, the regulations were once again replaced by the
Regulations Concerning Awards for Inventions and the Regulations Concerning Awards for
Technical Improvement Proposals. Many of these regulations were direct transplants from the Soviet
Union.
Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 14, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
19. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828
U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967).
20. World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], WIPO-Administered Treaties: Contracting Parties > Paris
Convention, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Aug. 5, 2019)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Although the 1984 statute ushered in a new innovation system, its
effectiveness “was greatly limited by a lack of experience with patent protection,
the uneasiness about introducing private rights in a socialist environment and a
myriad of compromises struck in the drafting process.”21 Notably, Article 25
excluded “pharmaceutical products, and substances obtained by means of a
chemical process,”22 similar to the exclusions found in the patent laws of India
and other developing countries.23 Such limited protection in the patent area, as
well as in other areas of intellectual property law such as copyright,24 eventually
led to increased external pressure from the United States and other developed
countries.25
In January 1992, China signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the
Protection of Intellectual Property with the United States, agreeing to strengthen
the protections for pharmaceuticals.26 Article 1(a) stated explicitly that “[p]atents
shall be available for all chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals and
agricultural chemicals, whether products or processes.”27 Article 2 further noted
China’s “agree[ment] to provide administrative protection to U.S. pharmaceutical
and agricultural chemical product inventions.”28
Pursuant to this memorandum of understanding, China amended its patent
law in September 1992,29 expanding the scope of protection to cover foods,
beverages, condiments, pharmaceutical products, and “substances obtained by
means of a chemical process.”30 In addition, the amended law added the right to
21. Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 14, at 7. For discussions of the debates surrounding the drafting
of the 1984 Patent Law, see generally WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 66, 70 (1995); ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS
OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 82–87 (2005); Yu, Building the Ladder,
supra note 14, at 6.
22. 1984 Patent Law, supra note 17, art. 25(5).
23. See Peter K. Yu, Virotech Patents, Viropiracy, and Viral Sovereignty, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1563, 1632–
33 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Virotech Patents] (discussing the Tek Chand Committee, the Ayyangar Committee,
and the 1970 Patent Act in India, which denied patent protection to pharmaceutical products).
24. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 14, at 8 (noting that, in the mid-1980s, “the United States’
main intellectual property concern was copyrights, not patents”).
25. See Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.–China IPR Negotiations: Trade, Intellectual Property, and the Rule
of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 165, 186 (Mark A.
Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (“At a 1985 meeting to the U.S.–China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade
(JCCT), the U.S. for the first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR [intellectual property right]
standards. In 1987, the U.S. put IPR protection on the agenda for U.S.–China market access talks.”); see also
Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 8, at 140–51 (describing the United States’ use of section 301
sanctions and various trade threats to induce China to strengthen protections for intellectual property rights).
26. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Intellectual Property, China–U.S., Jan. 17,
1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995).
27. Id. art. 1(a).
28. Id. art. 2.
29. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Sept. 4, 1992, effective January 1, 1993) (China) [hereinafter 1992 Patent Law].
30. Compare 1984 Patent Law, supra note 17, art. 25(4) (denying patent protection to “foods, beverages
and condiments”); id. art. 25(5) (denying patent protection to “pharmaceutical products, and substances
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import,31 extended patent protection to both products and processes,32 and
lengthened the duration of protection from fifteen to twenty years.33 The law also
severely curtailed the scope of compulsory licenses, which were of great concern
to the U.S. pharmaceutical industry.34 Taken together, these amended provisions
introduced to China the high patent standards that were then under negotiation at
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and that would soon find
their way to the final text of the TRIPS Agreement.35 A year after the adoption of
the 1992 Patent Law, China joined the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”).36
In the next few years, China prepared to join the WTO and worked hard to
conform its intellectual property laws to the TRIPS requirements.37 In August
2000, China amended its patent law for the second time.38 Consistent with the
TRIPS Agreement, the law prohibited the “offers for sale” of infringing
products,39 tightened the standards for obtaining a compulsory license,40 and
allowed for the judicial review of patent invalidations.41 To strengthen
protections for both local and foreign rights holders, the law required innocent
infringers to prove the legitimate source of the patented product.42 When it was
difficult to determine damages, the amended law allowed for calculation based
on appropriate royalties.43 In December 2001, China finally became the 143rd
member of the WTO.44
obtained by means of a chemical process”), with 1992 Patent Law, supra note 29, art. 25 (omitting these two
categories from patent ineligibility).
31. 1992 Patent Law, supra note 29, art. 11.
32. Id.
33. Id. art. 45.
34. Compare 1984 Patent Law, supra note 17, arts. 51–58 (providing for compulsory licenses), with
1992 Patent Law, supra note 29, arts. 51–58 (providing new arrangements for compulsory licenses).
35. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 27.1 (requiring WTO members to offer patent protection
to “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology” (emphasis added)); id. art. 28.1
(covering “importing” in addition to the “making, using, offering for sale, [or] selling” of patented products); id.
art. 31 (allowing for use without the patent holder’s authorization); id. art. 33 (“The term of protection available
shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”).
36. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. The PCT took effect
in China on January 1, 1994. Since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, and later SIPO and then the CNIPA, has
served as an international searching authority for PCT purposes. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES AND THEIR CLIENTS 233 (2010).
37. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 14, at 10 (“[T]he Second Amendment was adopted to
conform the Chinese patent system to WTO standards. The need for such conformity was understandable
considering China’s willingness to make significant sacrifices to join the WTO.”).
38. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000, effective July 1, 2001) (China).
39. Id. art. 11.
40. Id. arts. 48–50.
41. Id. art. 46.
42. Id. art. 63.
43. Id. art. 60.
44. See Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession
(Nov. 11, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (announcing China’s admission to the WTO); see also Peter K. Yu et al., China and the
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While the Chinese patent system experienced considerable changes in its first
two decades of existence, its repeated reforms were tailored more to external
demands than to changing internal conditions.45 It was not until the adoption of
the third amendment in December 2008 that China was able to make major
adjustments to the patent system based on its own needs, interests, conditions,
and priorities.46 As Guo He observed, “The impetus for the early amendments
came from outside, whilst the need for the third amendment originated from
within China, that is to say, the majority of the third amendment was to meet the
needs of the development of the domestic economy and technology originating in
China.”47
Reflecting “the country’s growing emphasis on using patents to help develop
a knowledge-based economy,”48 the 2008 Patent Law increased the amount of
damages and fines, including statutory damages.49 The law also allows for
parallel importation while introducing the Chinese equivalent of a Bolar
exception, which enables generic pharmaceutical producers to import,
manufacture, or test a patented product prior to the expiry of the patent “for the
purpose of scientific research and experimentation” or “providing information
required for administrative examination and approval.”50
A few months before the adoption of this third amendment, the State Council
adopted a new National Intellectual Property Strategy,51 which “provided a
comprehensive plan to improve the creation, utilization, protection, and
administration of intellectual property rights.”52 Paragraph 7 specifically
emphasized the need for active development of independent or self-controlled
intellectual property (zizhu zhishi chanquan).53 Building on this strategy and
taking advantage of the new patent law amendment, the State Intellectual
WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003) (discussing the ramifications of
China’s entry into the WTO).
45. While the Second Amendment conformed Chinese patent law to TRIPS standards, it also addressed
the rapidly changing local conditions, such as “the Chinese leaders’ changing attitude towards the rule of law,
the emergence of private property rights and local stakeholders, the increasing concerns about ambiguities over
relationships in state-owned enterprises, and the government’s active push for modernization.” Yu, From
Pirates to Partners II, supra note 8, at 908; see also id. at 914–22 (discussing these changing conditions).
46. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) (China) [hereinafter 2008 Patent Law].
47. Guo He, Patents, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS 25, 28 (Rohan
Kariyawasam ed., 2011).
48. Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 14, at 10.
49. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 46, art. 65.
50. Id. art. 69.
51. THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (2008), http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm
[hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); see also Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property System, 67
AM. U. L. REV. 1045, 1079–85 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship] (discussing the National
Intellectual Property Strategy).
52. Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 51, at 1079.
53. NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 51, ¶ 7.
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Property Office (“SIPO”), now the National Intellectual Property Administration
of China (“CNIPA”), adopted a National Patent Development Strategy in
November 2010.54 Although the SIPO strategy set a highly ambitious target of
two million patents per year by 2015,55 China surpassed that target in 2012.56
Today, China no longer hesitates to offer protection to patents and
pharmaceutical products—a significant contrast from three decades ago. Instead,
the country has slowly emerged as a major player in the international patent
system. In 2019, China even became the world’s leader in PCT applications,
overtaking the United States for the first time.57 Based on the latest statistics
provided by the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), Huawei
Technologies, Guangdong Oppo Mobile Telecommunications, the BOE
Technology Group, and Ping An Technology—all Chinese companies—ranked
among the world’s top eight corporate PCT applicants.58
At the domestic level, the total number of patent applications has been
equally impressive. Based on CNIPA statistics, China processed over 4.3 million
patent applications in 2018, with over 4.1 million originating in domestic
applicants.59 While these figures included three types of patents—those for
inventions, designs, and utility models—the total number of invention patents
issued in China in 2018 (432,147) compared favorably with the total number of
utility patents issued in the United States in the same year (306,909).60
To be sure, questions have arisen over the quality of patents that the CNIPA
and its predecessor, SIPO, have issued.61 Nevertheless, Chinese firms have been
54. STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY (2011–2020)
(2010), translated at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY];
see also Hao Nan, “Milestone” Patent Strategy Unveiled, CHINA DAILY (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2010-11/17/content_11560046.htm (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (reporting the launch of SIPO’s National Patent Development Strategy).
55. See NATIONAL PATENT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, supra note 54, at 4 (“The annual quantity of
applying for patents for inventions, utility models and designs [in the country] will reach 2 million.”).
56. See Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL.
PROP. 3, 5 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Chinese IP System] (noting that the two-million target “was surpassed in
2012, three years before the target date”).
57. Press Release, WIPO, China Becomes Top Filer of International Patents in 2019 Amid Robust
Growth
for
WIPO’s
IP
Services,
Treaties
and
Finances
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2020/article_0005.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
58.
Annex 2: Top PCT Applicants, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. (Mar. 19, 2019),
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/pressroom/en/documents/pr_2020_848_annexes.pdf#annex2 (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
59. Nat’l Intellectual Prop. Admin. of China [CNIPA], Total Applications/Grants/In Force for Three
Kinds of Patents Received from Home and Abroad, http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2018/a/a1.html
(last visited Aug. 4, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
60. Compare CNIPA, Distribution of Annual Grants for Three Kinds of Patents Received from Home
and Abroad, http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2018/b/b1.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2019) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review), with U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2018 PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 178 (2018) [hereinafter 2018 USPTO REPORT].
61. As Dan Prud’homme observed:
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actively applying for and obtaining patents at both the European Patent Office
and the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Based on the 2017 statistics
concerning patent applications filed in the United States, residents from mainland
China (32,127) were behind only those of Japan (89,364), South Korea (38,026),
and Germany (32,771).62 According to the European Patent Office, about sixteen
percent of its patent filings in that same year originated in China, which trailed
behind only the United States and Japan.63
As if these statistics were not impressive enough, China ranked fourteenth in
the 2019 Global Innovation Index,64 moving up from seventeenth in 2018,
twenty-second in 2017, and twenty-fifth in 2016.65 As the 2019 report stated,
“China continues its upward rise . . . and firmly establishes itself as one of the
innovation leaders.”66 The country “was [also] responsible for 24% of the
world’s [research-and-development] expenditures in 2017, up from only 2.6% in
1996.”67
Although developments in the electronics and telecommunications industries
have provided a key driving force behind China’s recent innovative turn—as
evidenced by the global leadership Huawei, Oppo, BOE, Ping An, and until
recently ZTE have assumed68—the country in recent years has also made a major
policy push toward actively developing the local pharmaceutical industry. For
instance, in February 2006, the State Council released the National Medium- and
Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development (2006–2020), which

While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also on the rise, patent quality has not
proportionately kept up and in fact the overall strength of China’s actual innovation appears
overhyped. Statistical analysis . . . not only reveals concerning trends in the quality of China’s
patents at present, but suggests that while patent filings in China will likely continue to notably grow
in the future, patent quality may continue to lag these numbers.
DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE: HOW PATENT-RELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER
INNOVATION IN CHINA 1 (2012) (emphasis omitted). See generally Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality:
Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478 (2012) (questioning
the quality of Chinese patents and offering suggestions for reform).
62. 2018 USPTO REPORT, supra note 60, at 184–85.
63. European Patent Office, European Patent Filings per Country of Origin, https://www.epo.org/aboutus/annual-reports-statistics/annual-report/2017/statistics/patent-filings.html#tab3 (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (last visited July 31, 2019).
64. Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019, supra note 3, at xxxiv, xxxiv.
65. Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2018: ENERGIZING THE WORLD WITH INNOVATION xx, xx
(Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2018); Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2017: INNOVATION FEEDING THE
WORLD xviii, xviii (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2017); Rankings, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2016:
WINNING WITH GLOBAL INNOVATION xviii, xviii (Soumitra Dutta et al. eds., 2016).
66. Soumitra Dutta et al., The Global Innovation Index 2019, in GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019,
supra note 3, at 1, 9.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Annex 2: Top PCT Applicants, supra note 58; see also Whitney Stenger, Mark Cohen: Global
Intellectual Property Ambassador, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 45–46 (2011) (“There have not been
many blockbuster pharma products coming out of China, so one cannot really equate 10,000 patents in China’s
[information technology] sector to 10,000 patents in the pharma sector.” (quoting Mark Cohen, the former
senior intellectual property attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing)).
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listed biotechnology as one of the eight frontier technologies.69 A decade later,
the State Council issued a notice for the Made in China 2025 strategic plan,
which also identified biomedicine and high-performance medical devices as one
of the ten priority sectors.70 Among the medical products and technologies that
China intends to develop are “biologic-based therapeutics, such as antibody
drugs, antibody-drug conjugates, new structural proteins, polypeptide drugs, and
new vaccines; technologies to support individualized drug treatments (i.e.,
precision medicine); and breakthrough technologies, such as induced pluripotent
stem cells.”71
In addition, China has played important roles in pushing for greater use and
development of artificial intelligence (“AI”) and machine learning in the health
area.72 As a contributor to Global Innovation Index 2019 stated:
Th[e] growth in national health expenditures is creating opportunities for
medical AI in China. According to Tractica’s forecast, China’s AI
medical market is developing rapidly, with the market size soaring from
9.661 billion yuan in 2016, and 13.65 billion yuan in 2017, to 20.4
billion yuan in 2018, maintaining a compound annual growth rate of
more than 40%. At the same time, Chinese medical institutions and
businesses are taking a proactive attitude towards AI. Nearly 80% of
hospitals and medical companies are planning to, or already have, carried
out medical AI applications and more than 75% of hospitals believe that
such applications will become popular in the future.73
III. CHANGING PHARMACEUTICAL LANDSCAPE
In April 2018, the National Medical Products Administration of China,
69. THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE NATIONAL MEDIUM- AND LONGTERM PLAN FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT (2006–2020): AN OUTLINE pt. V(1) (2006),
https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Cybersecurity/Documents/National_Strategies_Repository/China_2006.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
70. See THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MADE IN CHINA 2025 pt. VI (2015),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review); see also U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, MADE IN CHINA 2025: GLOBAL AMBITIONS BUILT ON
LOCAL PROTECTIONS 10 (2017) (identifying the ten priority sectors).
71. GRYPHON SCIENTIFIC, LLC & RHODIUM GROUP, LLC, CHINA’S BIOTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT:
THE ROLE OF US AND OTHER FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE U.S.–CHINA ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 38 (2019) [hereinafter CHINA’S BIOTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
STUDY]; see also WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 20 (“China is placing a strong emphasis on
development of capacity for biologic drugs, and in the near- to medium-term sees the introduction of biosimilar
drugs as a major domestic and global market opportunity.”).
72. See generally LEE KAI-FU, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE NEW WORLD
ORDER (2018) (discussing the development relating to artificial intelligence in China).
73. Ma, supra note 3, at 103 (footnote omitted); see also Peter K. Yu, Data Exclusivities in the Age of
Big Data, Biologics, and Plurilaterals, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. ARGUENDO 22, 22 (2018) (“The introduction of
big data analytics has transformed the fields of biotechnology and bioinformatics while ushering in major
advances in drug development, clinical practices, and medical financing.”).
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formerly the Food and Drug Administration of China, released the draft
Provisional Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for
Pharmaceutical Products.74 Article 5 of these measures not only provides six
years of protection to data submitted for the regulatory approval of innovative
drugs (chuangxin yao),75 but also twelve years of protection to undisclosed test or
other data for innovative therapeutic biologics (chuangxin zhiliao yong shengwu
zhipin).76 While the WTO accession protocol required China to offer at least six
years of protection to undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical
products77—a duration that Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement does not
require78—the accession protocol did not include any provision on biological
products.79 In fact, the protections for these products have been the subject of
major controversies in the negotiations for TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and
plurilateral agreements, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”)
Agreement.80
74. Provisional Measures for the Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceutical Products,
https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2018/04/draftdataexclusivityrules.doc (China) [hereinafter Provisional
Measures] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
75. Id. art. 5.
76. Id.; see also WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 19–21 (discussing the growing development of
biological products in China).
77. As the report of the Working Party on the Accession of China stated:
The representative of China . . . confirmed that China would, in compliance with Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement, provide effective protection against unfair commercial use of undisclosed test or
other data submitted to authorities in China as required in support of applications for marketing
approval of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilized new chemical
entities, except where the disclosure of such data was necessary to protect the public, or where steps
were taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use. This protection would
include introduction and enactment of laws and regulations to make sure that no person, other than
the person who submitted such data, could, without the permission of the person who submitted the
data, rely on such data in support of an application for product approval for a period of at least six
years from the date on which China granted marketing approval to the person submitting the data.
During this period, any second applicant for market authorization would only be granted market
authorization if he submits his own data. This protection of data would be available to all
pharmaceutical and agricultural products which utilize new chemical entities, irrespective of whether
they were patent-protected or not. The Working Party took note of these commitments.
World Trade Org., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China ¶ 284, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/CHN/49
(Oct. 1, 2001) [hereinafter WTO Accession Report].
78. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 39.3 (omitting the durational requirement); see also Peter
K. Yu, Data Exclusivities and the Limits to TRIPS Harmonization, 46 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 641, 651–52 (2019)
[hereinafter Yu, Data Exclusivities] (discussing the lack of the durational requirement in Article 39.3 of the
TRIPS Agreement).
79. See Srividhya Ragavan, The (Re)Newed Barrier to Access to Medication: Data Exclusivity, 51
AKRON L. REV. 1163, 1185 (2017) [hereinafter Ragavan, (Re)Newed Barrier] (“On the face of it, biologics are
not included within the scope of Article 39.3’s requirement to protect new chemical entities. The [new chemical
entities] should not, by definition, include biologics.” (footnote omitted)); Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note
78, at 689–90 (“Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement does not grant protection to biologics because those
products are not considered ‘new chemical entities’ within the meaning of the Agreement.”).
80. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Evolution of Public Health Provisions in Preferential Trade and
Investment Agreements of the United States, in CURRENT ALLIANCES IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAWMAKING: THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF MEGA-REGIONALS 45, 55 (Pedro Roffe & Xavier
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More recently, China proposed the fourth amendment to the Patent Law.81
Article 43 of that draft amendment grants a limited extension of the patent term
for up to five years to compensate for the time lost when a pharmaceutical
product is undergoing regulatory review.82 Should the duration of patent
protection be extended under this provision, the maximum protection will last for
fourteen years.83 The proposed Article 43 parallels the Hatch-Waxman Act of
1984 in the United States84 and similar provisions on patent term extension in
TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements.85
Taken together, these two sets of regulatory changes are important at both the
national and international levels. Domestically, China continues to face serious
problems in the public health arena, as illustrated by its past problems with
SARS, bird flu, and swine flu and its ongoing problem with COVID-19.86 With a
gross national income per capita of $9470 in 2018,87 China now ranks in the
Seuba eds., 2017) (noting that “negotiation of the duration of the biologics exclusivity period was perhaps the
most controversial part of the TPP negotiations”); Burcu Kilic & Courtney Pine, Decision Time on Biologics
Exclusivity: Eight Years Is No Compromise, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 27, 2015), http://www.ipwatch.org/2015/07/27/decision-time-on-biologics-exclusivity-eight-years-is-no-compromise/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“As the Trans-Pacific Partnership . . . negotiations approach their
endgame, biologics exclusivity is still considered ‘one of the most difficult outstanding issues in the
negotiation.’”).
81. Patent Law of People’s Republic of China (Draft) (2019) [hereinafter Draft Fourth Amendment],
translated at https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/2019-draft-patent-law-amendment-line-by-line-enand-cn-by-anjie.doc (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
82. See id. art. 43 (providing up to five years of extension of the patent term for innovative drugs); see
also Tim Jackson, China to Allow Patent Extension of Term?, ROUSE (May 16, 2018),
https://www.rouse.com/magazine/news/china-to-allow-patent-extension-of-term/ (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the potential extension of the patent term for pharmaceutical products in
China).
83. See Draft Fourth Amendment, supra note 81, art. 43 (limiting the maximum protection to fourteen
years).
84. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2018) (providing a limited extension of the patent term based on the period
during which a pharmaceutical product undergoes regulatory review).
85. See, e.g., Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.9.6, Aug. 5, 2004,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-americafta/final-text (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); United States–Australia Free Trade
Agreement, Austl.–U.S., art. 17.9.8, May 18, 2004, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/australian-fta/final-text (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); United States–
Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Sing.–U.S., art. 16.7.8, May 6, 2003, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/freetrade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. See NINA HACHIGIAN & MONA SUTPHEN, THE NEXT AMERICAN CENTURY: HOW THE U.S. CAN
THRIVE AS OTHER POWERS RISE 41 (2010) (“When it comes to influenza, China is both the problem and the
solution. Asia, especially southern China, is ground zero for flu outbreaks.”); Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note
23, at 1652 (“Because of the climate, crowdedness, and huge population, China and countries in Southeast Asia
have . . . been the breeding places for outbreaks of influenza and other infectious diseases.”); Press Release,
WHO, Pneumonia of Unknown Cause—China (Jan. 5, 2020), https://www.who.int/csr/don/05-january-2020pneumonia-of-unkown-cause-china/en/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (announcing
China’s reports of “pneumonia of unknown etiology,” which became COVID-19, to the World Health
Organization).
87.
GNI
per
Capita,
Atlas
Method
(Current
US$),
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD (last visited July 31, 2019) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
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middle among the upper-middle-income economies.88 In view of these conditions
and China’s continued eagerness to assume leadership in the developing world,
the recently proposed changes in the pharmaceutical arena are indeed surprising,
as these changes will move China’s policy position closer to that of developed
countries.89 Such a policy shift is particularly troubling considering the aging
Chinese population, which will require higher levels of healthcare while
imposing a greater internal demand for pharmaceutical and biological products.90
Globally, having twelve years of protection for undisclosed test or other data
for biological products in China is equally significant, because this lengthy
duration is not only the current U.S. standard, but also longer than what existing
TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements provide.91 Although
U.S. negotiators had pushed aggressively for this particular standard in the TPP
negotiations,92 the TPP negotiating parties eventually settled on protection for “at
least eight years from the date of first marketing approval.”93 Even more limiting,
the TPP Agreement guarantees only five years of such protection through market
exclusivity, while it offers protection for the remaining years through either
market exclusivity or “other measures,” depending on the preference of the

88.
See
World
Bank
Country
and
Lending
Groups,
WORLD
BANK,
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups
(last visited July 31, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“For the current 2020 fiscal
year, . . . upper middle-income economies are those with a [gross national income] per capita between $3,996
and $12,375 . . . .”).
89. See Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-repeated Questions About China’s Recent Rise as a Patent Power, 2013
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 78, 113 [hereinafter Yu, Five Oft-Repeated Questions] (“It will . . . be no surprise
if China is aligned with the developing world with respect to certain issues, but with the developed world with
respect to others.”); see also Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 673, 722 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms] (“Although [China, India,
and other emerging countries] have yet to embrace the very high protection and enforcement standards found in
the European Union, Japan, or the United States, they now welcome standards that are higher than what is
currently available in the Asia-Pacific region.”).
90. See WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 1 (“China has a population of approximately 1.4 billion
people, and it is a population that is rapidly aging. This will increase demand for pharmaceuticals, and place
increasing burden on the health care budget and system as a whole.”); Characterising Eastern China’s
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Market: Shandong and Jiangsu, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (June 13, 2019),
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/comment/china-pharmaceutical-industry-2019/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that “the population [in China] will become increasingly more
aged and require greater levels of medical treatment”); Ren Shuli, Selling Drugs Is No Longer a Free Lunch in
China, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-02/china-s-drugmarket-is-no-longer-a-free-lunch (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting “a rapidly
aging population and 4 million new cancer patients each year” in China).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018) (providing twelve years of protection to undisclosed test or
other data for biological products).
92. See Kilic & Pine, supra note 80 (“In late 2013, the United States Trade Representative . . . proposed
12 years of exclusivity (which functions as marketing exclusivity rather than data exclusivity) for biologics in
the TPP, even though this contradicts and is mutually exclusive with the Administration’s domestic policy
proposals.”).
93. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 18.51.1(a), Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [hereinafter TPP Agreement] (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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relevant TPP party.94 As if these compromises had not weakened the
international standard for biological products significantly enough, the TPP
provision was suspended in its entirety95 following the United States’ withdrawal
from the regional pact96 and the establishment of the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”).97 As a result,
the high eight-year standard for undisclosed test or other data for biological
products is no longer binding on the eleven CPTPP signatories.
In fall 2018, the United States successfully resuscitated the TPP standard
through the negotiation of the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement
(“USMCA”).98 Aiming to replace the North American Free Trade Agreement
(“NAFTA”),99 the USMCA was signed in November 2018.100 Article 20.49 in the
signed text offers protection to undisclosed test or other data submitted for the
regulatory approval of biological products, which lasts “for a period of at least
ten years from the date of first marketing approval of that product.”101 Although
ten years is shorter than the duration in the United States, it is still longer than
that of both Canada (eight years) and Mexico (no protection).102 The ten-year
duration is also two years longer than the TPP standard, which was until then the

94. Id. art. 18.51.1(b)(ii).
95. See Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, Mar. 8, 2018, art. 2,
Annex, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-concluded-but-not-inforce/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text [hereinafter CPTPP]
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (suspending articles 18.50 and 18.51 of the TPP
Agreement); see also Peter K. Yu, Thinking About the Trans-Pacific Partnership (and a Mega-Regional
Agreement on Life Support), 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 97, 105 (2017) [hereinafter Yu, Thinking About
TPP] (discussing the CPTPP’s suspension of select TPP provisions).
96. See Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 23, 2017) (directing the United States Trade
Representative to “withdraw the United States as a signatory to the [TPP and] . . . from TPP negotiations”); see
also Yu, Thinking About TPP, supra note 95, at 101–10 (discussing the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP
Agreement and its aftermath).
97. CPTPP, supra note 95; see also Yu, Thinking About the TPP, supra note 95, at 104–06 (discussing
the CPTPP). The later agreement was signed in Santiago, Chile in March 2018 and entered into force at the end
of that year.
98. United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement [hereinafter USMCA] (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
99. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
100. See Glenn Thrush, Trump Says He Plans to Withdraw from Nafta, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/us/politics/trump-withdraw-nafta.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (reporting President Trump’s announcement of his intention to withdraw the United States
from NAFTA).
101. USMCA, supra note 98, art. 20.49; see also Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 78, at 682–83
(discussing Article 20.49 of the USMCA).
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018) (providing twelve years of protection to undisclosed test or
other data for biological products); Letter from Representative Jan Schakowsky et al. to Robert E. Lighthizer,
U.S. Trade Representative (July 11, 2019), https://schakowsky.house.gov/uploads/lighthizermeds.pdf
[hereinafter Schakowsky Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Mexico . . . has no
additional exclusivity period for biologics, and . . . Canada . . . has an eight-year period.”).
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high watermark for international protection in this area.103
Unlike Article 18.51 of the TPP Agreement, the USMCA provision does not
allow for substitutional protection “through other measures.”104 The only
flexibility Canada and Mexico received was a transition clause, which delays
protection for five years.105 It is therefore no surprise that U.S. policymakers
were so concerned about the high protections for biological products under the
new agreement that they called on the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) to “amend the USMCA to increase competition and
enhance patient access to more affordable prescription drugs,” including
biological products.106 In December 2019, USMCA signatories amended the
agreement by removing Article 20.49.107 As a result, the USMCA no longer
protects undisclosed test or other data for biological products, similar to the
CPTPP.
In sum, the proposed twelve years of protection for undisclosed test or other
data for biological products in China is higher than the standard laid down in
even the most aggressive TRIPS-plus bilateral, regional, and plurilateral
agreements. That lengthy duration also puts China in parity with the United
States.108 While such stronger protection would certainly attract foreign providers
of biological products to undertake research and development in China,109 such
protection also reveals China’s eagerness to become more assertive in the
pharmaceutical arena.110 Just like how Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE,
103. See TPP Agreement, supra note 93, art. 18.51.1 (providing eight years of protection to undisclosed
test or other data for biological products).
104. Compare TPP Agreement, supra note 93, art. 18.51.1(b), with USMCA, supra note 98, art. 20.49.
105. See USMCA, supra note 98, art. 20.90.3(e) (delaying the protection under Article 20.49 for five
years in Canada); id. art. 20.90.4(c) (delaying the protection under Article 20.49 for five years in Mexico).
106. Schakowsky Letter, supra note 102. As the letter stated, “Unless the USMCA text is amended, it
would limit Congress’ ability to adjust the biologics exclusivity period, instead locking the US into policies that
keep cancer and other drug prices high while exporting this model to Mexico . . . and . . . Canada . . . .” Id.; see
also Allison Inserro, House Democrats Ask US Trade Representative to Drop Biologics Language from
USMCA, CTR. FOR BIOSIMILARS (July 12, 2019), https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/news/house-democratsask-us-trade-representative-to-drop-biologics-language-from-usmca (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (reporting the letter).
107. Protocol of Amendment to the Agreement Between the United States of America, the United
Mexican
States,
and
Canada
art.
3.E,
Can.–Mex.–U.S.,
Dec.
10,
2019,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Protocol-of-Amendments-to-the-UnitedStates-Mexico-Canada-Agreement.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
108. Compare Provisional Measures, supra note 74, art. 5, with 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2018).
109. See Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra note 78, at 696 (“Stronger protections for undisclosed test or other
data for pharmaceutical and biological products will certainly make China a much more appealing place for
conducting clinical trials.”); Mark Cohen, Draft of Data Exclusivity Rules Released by CFDA, CHINA IPR (Apr.
26, 2018), https://chinaipr.com/2018/04/26/draft-of-data-exclusivity-rules-released-by-cfda/ (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“As a policy matter, [the proposed Provisional Measures for the
Implementation of Test Data Protection for Pharmaceutical Products] appears intended to help encourage
conducting clinical trials in China as well as new product introduction into the Chinese market[.]”).
110. See CHINA’S BIOTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT STUDY, supra note 71, at 3 (“As China’s
biotechnology industry develops, we are likely to see continued advancement in medical biotechnology,
especially in biologics, genomics, and molecular diagnostics. Chinese biologics companies may move further
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and BOE have built their portfolios of PCT applications, China is now actively
undertaking legal and regulatory reforms to create national champions in the
pharmaceutical arena.
IV. RAMIFICATIONS
In view of China’s growing assertiveness in this arena and the changing
domestic and global pharmaceutical landscapes, this Part explores the
ramifications such assertiveness will have in the intellectual property and public
health areas. Specifically, the discussion focuses on three sets of ramifications:
(1) the changing discourse on intellectual property developments in China; (2)
the internal challenges that confront the country at this time of policy transition;
and (3) the global complications that will affect the future development of the
international trading and intellectual property systems.
A. Changing Discourse
Since the mid-1980s, China has become the poster child of intellectual
property piracy and counterfeiting.111 Every year, the USTR puts the country on
its watch list or priority watch list.112 In the past three years, its out-of-cycle
reviews have placed Alibaba’s Taobao on the list of notorious online markets.113
If pharmaceuticals are mentioned in the Chinese context, the discussion often
focuses on counterfeit drugs.114 For example, in China Rx, Rosemary Gibson and
toward producing innovative drugs.”); WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 17, 29 (“Chinese manufacturers
are moving away from reliance on API production toward [finished pharmaceutical products], in part because of
generally low profit margins associated with APIs. . . . The China Government is strongly encouraging R&D in
the pharmaceutical sector, with respect to new biologic products.” (footnote omitted)); Yu, Data Exclusivities,
supra note 78, at 694 (“China wants to develop a research-based pharmaceutical industry.”); see also LI
YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 54 (2010) (“China has advantages in producing ‘me too’ drugs because its
capacity to conduct organic synthesis is very strong after many years of China’s being the target for outsourced
[multinational pharmaceutical companies’] business.”).
111. See sources cited supra note 8.
112. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 380
(2012) (listing the USTR’s Special 301 actions from 2001 to 2011). The notable exception is during the
honeymoon period following China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001. In April 2005, the USTR
elevated China back to the Priority Watch List. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 8, at 925.
113. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS
MARKETS 26–27 (2019); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 20–23 (2018); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE
REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 12–13 (2016). Alibaba “was last on th[at] list in 2012.” Scott Cendrowski,
Why Alibaba Can’t Complain About Its Return to the “Notorious” Counterfeit Market List, FORTUNE (Dec. 22,
2016), https://fortune.com/2016/12/22/alibaba-taobao-counterfeit-goods-platform/ (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
114. As Daniel Chow observed:
China is the largest exporter of counterfeit and substandard drugs in the world. It is also a major
supplier of both genuine and substandard [APIs]. China makes counterfeit, substandard drugs and
APIs for use in China and, perhaps more importantly, for export to countries around the world.
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Janardan Prasad Singh warned about the increasing risks of the growing
dependence of the global supply chain for pharmaceutical products and vitamins
on the APIs originating in China.115 In the past few months, commentators also
expressed similar concerns in relation to the potential shortages of medicines
amid the COVID-19 pandemic.116
While piracy and counterfeiting remain relevant to any discussion of
intellectual property protection and enforcement in China, and such discussion is
unlikely to go away in the near future,117 one cannot overlook the many important
developments that are now happening in the country. In the past decade, China
has tremendously increased its innovative capabilities, relying on innovation
models that are sometimes different from those found in the Western world.118
China has also made notable achievements in biotechnology (including genomics
and stem cell research), space technology, information technology,

These counterfeit exports can cause serious health problems, even deaths, and can subject MNCs
[multinational corporations] to liability for these injuries. In addition, counterfeits can cause damage
to the business reputation of MNCs and the goodwill associated with their brands. MNCs and the
U.S. government have found themselves stymied in efforts to identify, locate, and shut down
counterfeiters in China producing these illegal products.
Daniel C.K. Chow, Three Major Problems Threatening Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies Doing
Business in China, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 46, 78 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
115. ROSEMARY GIBSON & JANARDAN PRASAD SINGH, CHINA RX: EXPOSING THE RISKS OF AMERICA’S
DEPENDENCE ON CHINA FOR MEDICINE (2018).
116. See Ana Swanson, Coronavirus Spurs U.S. Efforts to End China’s Chokehold on Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/economy/coronavirus-china-trumpdrugs.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The global spread of the coronavirus is
reigniting efforts by the Trump administration to encourage more American manufacturing of pharmaceuticals
and reduce dependence on China for the drugs and medical products that fuel the federal health care system.”);
Guy Taylor, “Wake-Up Call”: Chinese Control of U.S. Pharmaceutical Supplies Sparks Growing Concern,
WASH. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/mar/17/china-threatens-restrictcritical-drug-exports-us/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“With the coronavirus crisis
threatening to strain the U.S. government’s large stockpiles of such drugs, health experts warn that China’s own
outbreak and related societal shutdown could mean major shortages ahead as Chinese factories struggle to keep
up production of the APIs.”).
117. See Yu, Chinese IP System, supra note 56, at 6–7 (noting that “piracy and counterfeiting problems
[in China] continue to exist, and are unlikely to go away any time soon”); see also Peter K. Yu, Three Questions
That Will Make You Rethink the U.S.–China Intellectual Property Debate, 7 J. MARSHALL REV. INTEL. PROP. L.
412, 423 (2008) (“[S]tronger intellectual property protection will appear in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and
other major cities and coastal regions. Meanwhile, the massive piracy and counterfeiting problems will stay in
China, migrating from the country’s developed parts to its less developed parts.”).
118. See Peter K. Yu, Imitative Pasts, Innovation Pathways and Intellectual Property, in INNOVATION
AND TRIPLE HELIX (Anselm Kamperman Sanders ed., forthcoming 2021) (discussing China’s innovation paths);
Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 51, at 1103–07 (identifying a growing body of scholarship that
examines the fast-growing innovative capabilities of Chinese firms and the alternative forms of innovation in
China). For discussions of innovation in China, see generally DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF
THE RED QUEEN: GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA (2011);
JOHN L. ORCUTT & SHEN HONG, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE: UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER IN TRANSITION (2011); TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE
CHANGING THE WORLD (2011); ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: HOW
CHINESE COST INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007).
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nanotechnology, and advanced energy technology.119
In addition, as Part II has noted, China has now become a world leader in
filing international and foreign patent applications.120 In terms of health patent
publications, the Global Innovation Index 2019 placed China among the top three
in the world in the areas of biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and medical
technology, based on publications from 2010 to 2017.121 From 1985 to 2017,
“China ranked fourth in the total number of healthcare AI patent applications
filed, contributing to 12% of the total.”122 In 2016, China already “surpassed
Japan and the European Union to become the world’s second largest healthcare
AI applicant . . . , which reflects the strong momentum of medical technology
innovation in China.”123
At some point, we will have to recognize the incomplete, or paradoxical,
nature of the ongoing discourse about intellectual property developments in
China. In the same month that the United States filed its second WTO complaint
against China for providing inadequate intellectual property protection and
violating the TRIPS Agreement,124 WIPO announced that China had overtaken
Japan to become the country with the second largest number of PCT applications
in the world.125 Likewise, although U.S. politicians and policymakers have been
quick to criticize the lack of intellectual property protection in the country, many
of them express concern about China’s growing technological competition with
the United States.126 If traditional innovation and intellectual property theories
are correct that a country needs good innovation and intellectual property policies
to strengthen technological capabilities, the discourse cannot continue to
emphasize the two ends of the spectrum without also recognizing developments
in the middle.
To be sure, the “vast size, political and economic complexities, and often
internally inconsistent laws and policies” of China have made it possible for the
simultaneous occurrence of developments at these two polarized ends.127 In fact,
my past scholarship noted the possibility for China to “emerge as a highly
119. See ORCUTT & SHEN, supra note 118, at ix (identifying these achievements).
120. See supra text accompanying notes 57–58 and 62–63.
121. Dutta et al., supra note 66, at 48.
122. Ma, supra note 3, at 104.
123. Id.
124. Second TRIPS Complaint, supra note 10.
125. Press Release, WIPO, China Drives International Patent Applications to Record Heights; Demand
Rising
for
Trademark
and
Industrial
Design
Protection
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2018/article_0002.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
126. See SECTION 301 INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 9, at 10–18 (documenting China’s technology
drive); CHINA’S BIOTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT STUDY, supra note 71, at 12–44 (discussing the state of and
changes in China’s biotechnology industry).
127. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Asian Philosophy and the Yin-Yang School, 7 WIPO J. 1, 12
(2015) [hereinafter Yu, Yin-Yang School]; see also Yu, Five Oft-Repeated Questions, supra note 89, at 81 (“In
the future, China is likely to see both the yin of continued massive piracy and counterfeiting and the yang of
China’s rise as an intellectual property power at the same time.”).
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innovative power while at the same time remaining as the world’s biggest pirate
nation.”128 To the extent that policymakers and commentators are willing to
entertain such a dualistic—and somewhat paradoxical—possibility, it will be
important for them to devote greater time, effort, and energy to exploring the
laws, policies, and complementary measures that China will need to address
these seemingly oxymoronic developments.129 While history has shown countries
such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea crossing over from pirate
nations to countries respectful of intellectual property rights, we do not yet have
good theories or empirical data to account for countries that have been active in
both directions.130
B. Internal Challenges
The second area that deserves greater attention concerns the internal
challenges that the changing pharmaceutical landscape will create within China.
A notable characteristic of this vast, complex country is its highly uneven
economic and technological developments. Commentators have widely noted the
country’s wide regional disparities131 and high Gini coefficient, which indicates
the gap between the rich and the poor.132 To a large extent, China has the
characteristics of “a ‘country of countries,’ rather than a homogenous one.”133 It
would fit what Nobel Laureate Michael Spence described as a “dual economy,”
128. Yu, Yin-Yang School, supra note 127, at 13.
129. See id. (noting the “need to come up with new theories, concepts, vocabularies and even schools of
thought to address th[e] unforeseen situation” in which a country will emerge as a highly innovative power
while at the same time remaining as the world’s biggest pirate nation); see also Peter K. Yu, A Spatial Critique
of Intellectual Property Law and Policy, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2045, 2123–27 (2017) [hereinafter Yu,
Spatial Critique] (discussing the possibility of developing differentiated intellectual property standards at the
subnational level).
130. See Yu, Five Oft-Repeated Questions, supra note 89, at 113–14 (“Although internal contradictions
are not uncommon in China, especially when one takes into account the country’s uneven regional, sectoral, and
technological developments, this complex, dualistic, and highly dynamic picture suggests the possibility for a
new phenomenon that the world has never seen before.” (footnote omitted)); Yu, Yin-Yang School, supra note
127, at 13 (“[A]lthough history has seen countries crossing over from the less respectful side of the intellectual
property divide to the more promising one—the United States, Japan and South Korea being some of the more
notable instances—no country has ever stayed on both ends of the spectrum at the same time.”).
131. As I noted in an earlier article:
China is large, complex, diverse, and “sometimes internally contradictory.” The Chinese speak
different languages, enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and subscribe to
different historical and philosophical traditions. Conditions in Beijing are often very different from
those in Guangzhou, intellectual property strategies that are effective in Shanghai are likely to fail in
a village in western China, and the trade patterns found in the coastal areas are very different from
those found in the inland areas.
Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual Property Schizophrenia, 2007
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 23 [hereinafter Yu, Regime Complex] (footnote omitted).
132. See Peter K. Yu, Foreword to PATENTS AND INNOVATION IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG KONG:
TWO SYSTEMS IN ONE COUNTRY COMPARED xiv, xvii (Li Yahong ed., 2017) (“According to the National
Bureau of Statistics, [in 2016] China had a Gini coefficient of 0.465, one of the highest in the world.”).
133. Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 8, at 963.
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which consists of “a relatively rich one whose growth is constrained by the
normal forces that constrain the growth of relatively advanced economies, and a
poor one where the early-stage growth dynamics . . . just didn’t start, owing to its
separation from the modern domestic economy and the global economy.”134
More specifically in the intellectual property area, China has experienced
highly uneven technological developments. Consider, for instance, the number of
invention patents filed and granted in its different provinces and autonomous
regions. Based on CNIPA statistics, in 2018 Guangdong, Jiangsu, and
Zhejiang—the provinces with the three largest volumes of applications—had
216,469, 198,801, and 143,081 applications, respectively.135 Meanwhile, Jilin,
Yunnan, and Shanxi (those provinces that ranked eighteenth to twentieth) had
only 10,530, 9,606, and 9,395 applications, respectively.136 In the same year, the
total numbers of patent grants for Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang were
53,259, 42,019, and 32,550, respectively.137 By contrast, the total numbers for
Jilin, Yunnan, and Shanxi were 2,868, 2,297, and 2,284, respectively.138 For
either patent applications or grants, the figures for the less developed provinces
were less than one-tenth of the figures for their more developed counterparts. If
we include in the second group those provinces and autonomous regions that
have fewer than 4,000 patent applications and 1,000 patent grants, such as Inner
Mongolia, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Hainan, Qinghai, and Tibet, the statistical contrasts
between these two groups will become even starker.139
From a policy standpoint, these disparities are highly significant. In fact, the
remarkably uneven economic and technological developments in China have
suggested the country’s need to develop schizophrenic intellectual property
policies.140 What policies China needs in one region may not be the same as what
134. MICHAEL SPENCE, THE NEXT CONVERGENCE: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH IN A
MULTISPEED WORLD 204 (2011) (referring to the “dual economy” in Brazil); see also FAREED ZAKARIA, THE
POST-AMERICAN WORLD 133 (2008) (making a similar observation regarding India: “[India] might have
several Silicon Valleys, but it also has three Nigerias within it—that is, more than 300 million people living on
less than a dollar a day.”).
135.
CNIPA, Domestic Applications and Applications for Three Kinds of Patents,
http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2018/a/a4.html (last visited July 31, 2019) [hereinafter CNIPA,
Domestic Applications] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
136. Id.
137.
CNIPA,
Domestic
Grants
for
Three
Kinds
of
Patents,
http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/tjxx/jianbao/year2018/b/b3.html (last visited July 31, 2019) [hereinafter CNIPA,
Domestic Grants] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
138. Id.
139. CNIPA, Domestic Applications, supra note 135; CNIPA, Domestic Grants, supra note 137.
140. As I noted in a recent article:
From the standpoint of intellectual property development, having highly uneven subnational
development could create major challenges for policymakers, especially in relation to the
establishment of a national intellectual property strategy, such as the one the State Council of China
launched in June 2008. If the relevant government leaders seek to tailor protection to the divergent
economic and technological conditions in different regions, they likely will have to come up with a
“schizophrenic” nationwide intellectual property policy. Under such a policy, protection will be
tighter in fast-growing and technologically proficient regions but much weaker in their less-
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works in another. Moreover, because different sectors in China develop at
different paces, the need for schizophrenic policies can be attributed to not only
regional disparities, but also sectoral disparities. As I noted a decade ago, before
the State Council’s adoption of the National Intellectual Property Strategy,
“based on existing developments, China is likely to prefer stronger protection of
intellectual property rights in entertainment, software, semiconductors, and
selected areas of biotechnology to increased protection in areas concerning
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs.”141
From a public health standpoint, the uneven economic and technological
developments in China have also been highly alarming. As China increases its
assertiveness in the pharmaceutical arena and as the pharmaceutical landscape
continues to evolve, one cannot help but wonder whether and how China’s
eagerness to develop national champions in this arena will affect the overall
access of the Chinese populace to medicines and healthcare. As Frederick Abbott
rightly reminded us:
[I]n order for the health sector not to be adversely affected, there must be
some type of transfer payment, whether in the form of increased public
health expenditures on pharmaceuticals, by providing health insurance
benefits, or other affirmative acts. In a world of economic scarcity, the
prospect that governments will act to offset increases in medicines prices
with increased public health expenditures is uncertain.142
To be sure, innovation and intellectual property policies remain key
components of the larger public health policy. If stronger intellectual property
rights are created, such protections can be balanced by greater limitations and
exceptions to these rights, as well as by introducing competition law, other legal
or policy safeguards, or complementary public health measures.143 Nevertheless,
developed counterparts.
Yu, Spatial Critique, supra note 129, at 2096 (footnotes omitted); see also Yu, Regime Complex, supra note
131, at 24–25 (explaining why the intellectual property developments in China should not be analyzed as if the
country were homogeneous).
141. Yu, Regime Complex, supra note 131, at 25.
142. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle of Action and Reaction: Developments and Trends in Intellectual
Property and Health, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 33
(Pedro Roffe et al. eds., 2006).
143. See Eric Ng, China Pharma Must Swallow That Jagged Little Pill Called R&D as Government
Slashes Profit Margins of Generic Drugs, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 19, 2019),
https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/2182740/china-pharma-must-swallow-jagged-little-pillcalled-rd-government (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting “Beijing’s recent pilot
roll-out of state hospital bulk purchase open bidding” and that “the first round of price bidding in 11 cities saw
prices slashed by 62 per cent on average”). Included in this centralized medicine procurement scheme were
Beijing, Chengdu, Chongqing, Dalian, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Xi’an, and
Xiamen. Press Release, The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Approves
Centralized
Medicine
Procurement
(Jan.
17,
2019),
http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2019/01/17/content_281476482971182.htm (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
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as we have seen in many parts of the world—especially in developing
countries—the development of a strong patent system often results in a lower
quality of healthcare for those who cannot afford high-priced drugs.144 Even if
there is hope that China will eventually find a way to create a more balanced
healthcare system amid its effort to create national champions in the
pharmaceutical arena,145 there are very few, if any, historical examples for China
to use as reference points. The continuous public concern about inadequate or
unaffordable healthcare indeed explained why the film Dying to Survive
resonated with tens of millions in China and became a local blockbuster.146
Policymakers and commentators should not overlook the costs of creating
national pharmaceutical champions.
A related area that also deserves policy and scholarly attention concerns the
impact of the recent law and policy changes on the future development of
traditional Chinese medicine,147 which in 2015 “account[ed] for 28.55% of the
total [output value] generated by the country’s pharmaceutical industry.”148
144. See generally COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 29–
55 (2002) (discussing issues lying at the intersection of intellectual property, development, and public health).
145. As Frederick Abbott observed in a World Health Organization study: “[T]he single most important
aspect of China’s current policy with respect to the pharmaceutical sector is its close linkage to the objective of
universal health care (UHC). UHC is a key priority for the China Government, which has committed to
providing access to medicines for its people.” WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 1; see also id. at 6–7
(discussing China’s commitment to universal health care).
146. DYING TO SURVIVE [WO BU SHI YAOSHEN] (Dirty Monkey Films Group 2018); see also Chinese
Box
Office
for
2018,
BOX
OFFICE
MOJO,
https://www.boxofficemojo.com/year/2018/?area=CN&ref_=bo_yl_table_3 (last visited Apr. 13, 2020) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing statistics on the film’s phenomenal success in the
Chinese box office). Wo bu shi yaoshen translates to “I am not God of Medicine.” Based on a real-life story, the
film concerned the owner of a Chinese aphrodisiac store who smuggled cheap generic medicine from India for
sale at affordable prices to leukemia patients in China.
147. As Fan Ruiping explained:
Traditional Chinese medicine dramatically differs from modern scientific medicine in its basic
medical orientation, physiological theories, etiology, diagnostics, therapeutics, and pharmacology.
For instance, while modern scientific medicine views the essence of illness as
anatomicopathological, traditional Chinese medicine views it as symptom-complex (zheng) of the
whole body. While scientific medicine identifies the sources of illness as disease entities, Chinese
medicine identifies them as imbalanced climate and/or emotional factors. While scientific medicine
uses advanced lab and mechanical investigations as diagnostic means, Chinese medicine uses
ordinary contacts (looking, smelling, asking, and feeling) to locate problems. While scientific
medicine emphasizes pathological anatomy, Chinese medicine focuses on the patient’s complaint
and actual experience of being sick. While scientific medicine aims at curing diseases, Chinese
medicine appeals to balancing functional factors. While scientific medicine employs chemical drugs
or surgeries, Chinese medicine appeals to natural herbs or simple needles.
Fan Ruiping, Modern Western Science as a Standard for Traditional Chinese Medicine: A Critical Appraisal,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 213, 213 (2003); see also WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 21–22 (discussing the
development of traditional Chinese medicines in China).
148. WHO, WHO GLOBAL REPORT ON TRADITIONAL AND COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE 2019, at 164
(2019) [hereinafter WHO TRADITIONAL MEDICINE REPORT]. As the World Health Organization stated in its
latest report on traditional and complementary medicines:
As at end 2017, more than 60 000 traditional Chinese medicines and ethnic minority medicines have
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Although English-language discussions of intellectual property protections for
traditional Chinese medicines and the related challenges remain limited,149 a
sizeable portion of the Chinese population still relies heavily on this type of
medicine, or a combination of both Western and Chinese medicines.150 Thus, in
view of China’s growing assertiveness in the pharmaceutical arena, it is fair to
ask how such assertiveness will affect the future development of traditional
Chinese medicine. Will the greater development of Western medicine and
national champions that specialize in the development of such medicine lead to
more innovation of traditional Chinese medicine?151 More integration?152 More

been approved (based on the number of Approval Letters), and 4424 pharmaceutical enterprises
(including active pharmaceutical ingredient and finished dosage forms) have been granted
manufacturing licences and passed the [good manufacturing practice] inspection. In addition, 177
sites for crude drugs (raw pharmaceutical materials) have been certified for good agricultural
practices (GAP). Chinese drug regulatory authorities are also exploring the revision of GAP and the
implementation of a record system for Chinese crude drugs. A modern Chinese pharmaceutical
industry, held together by commerce, has been established. In 2015, the total output value of the
traditional Chinese medicine pharmaceutical industry was RMB 786.6 billion, accounting for
28.55% of the total generated by the country’s pharmaceutical industry.
Id.
149. For discussions of the protection for traditional Chinese medicines and related challenges, see
generally LI, supra note 110, at 35–36; Jerry I.H. Hsiao, Patent Protection for Chinese Herbal Medicine
Product Invention in Taiwan, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 1 (2007); Li Xuan & Li Weiwei, Inadequacy of
Patent Regime on Traditional Medicinal Knowledge—A Diagnosis of 13-Year Traditional Medicinal
Knowledge Patent Experience in China, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 125 (2007); Lin Peng, Striking a Balance
Between Intellectual Property Protection of Traditional Chinese Medicine and Access to Knowledge, 7
TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 271 (2015); Zhang Dong, Observations from a TRIPS Perspective: Do We Need a
Traditional Medicine Exemption for Patent Standards, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 305 (2011); Zhuo Jing, Legal
Protection of Traditional Chinese Medicine in the Context of the Creative Economy, 47 HONG KONG L.J. 171
(2017); Benjamin Liu, Comment, Past Cultural Achievement as a Future Technological Resource:
Contradictions and Opportunities in the Intellectual Property Protection of Chinese Medicine in China, 21
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 75 (2003).
150. As the World Health Organization stated in its report:
At the end of 2015, there were 3966 traditional Chinese medicine hospitals across the country,
including 253 hospitals of ethnic minority medicine and 446 hospitals of integrated Chinese and
Western medicine; there were 452 000 practitioners and assistant practitioners of traditional Chinese
medicine (including practitioners of ethnic minority medicine and integrated Chinese and Western
medicine); there were 42 528 traditional Chinese medicine clinics, including 550 for ethnic minority
medicine and 7706 for integrated medicine; there were 910 million visits that year to traditional
Chinese medicine medical and health service units across the country and 26 915 000 in-patients
treated.
WHO TRADITIONAL MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 148, at 164; see also Fan, supra note 147, at 214–16
(documenting the prosperous development of traditional Chinese medicines and medical practices in China
while lamenting that the monostandard used in the integrated Chinese health care system).
151. See Zhuo, supra note 149, at 177 (“Science, technology and innovation are . . . indispensable
elements for the advancement of the pharmaceutical industry, and in particular the [traditional Chinese
medicine] industry in China . . . .”).
152. See WHO TRADITIONAL MEDICINE REPORT, supra note 148, at 164 (“The state encourages
exchanges between traditional Chinese medicine and Western medicine, and creates opportunities for Western
medical practitioners to learn from their traditional Chinese medicine counterparts.”); Zhuo, supra note 149, at
179 (“[S]cience, technology and innovation have . . . increased the combined applications of [traditional
Chinese medicine] and western medicine.”).
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co-evolution? More displacement? Or more weakening? What impact, if any,
such development will have on the Chinese populace?
C. Global Complications
The final area that deserves greater attention pertains to the global
complications China’s changing position in the pharmaceutical arena has
generated. Since entering the WTO in December 2001, China has joined Brazil
and India in pushing for stronger accommodation of developing countries’
interests in the international trading and intellectual property systems.153 Together
with Russia and South Africa, these three countries have worked hard to explore
greater cooperation in the BRICS context.154
Ironically, China’s recent policy shift in the pharmaceutical arena will create
tensions, if not conflicts, with India.155 While India remains eager to provide
strong support for generic drugs at the international level156—notwithstanding the
changing dynamics in its pharmaceutical industry157—China’s position is now
153. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations, the BRICS Factor and the Changing North–
South Debate, in THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE TO GLOBAL COOPERATION 148, 149 (Rostam J. Neuwirth et al.
eds., 2017) [hereinafter Yu, BRICS Factor] (“Having acceded to the World Trade Organization . . . in
December 2001, China has now joined Brazil and India—the two longtime leaders of the developing world—in
pushing for their preferred international trade and intellectual property norms.”); Yu, Access to Medicines,
supra note 1, at 358–62 (arguing that, if Brazil, China, and India are willing to team up with each other, they
could form a formidable alliance that could rival the traditional trilateral alliance among the European Union,
Japan, and the United States); Yu, Virotech Patents, supra note 23, at 1645 (“Whether the debate is about
access to essential medicines or the protection of genetic materials in viruses, less developed countries have
played a very important role. Of particular importance are the policy positions taken by leaders of this group:
Brazil, China, and India.”).
154. “BRICS” refers to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. See Yu, Half-Century of
Scholarship, supra note 51, at 1116 (noting the past BRICS summits); see also Yu, BRICS Factor, supra note
153 (discussing the “BRICS factor” in international trade and intellectual property negotiations).
155. Cf. WHO CHINA STUDY, supra note 1, at 17 (“China . . . appears to have displaced India as the
largest API exporter, and Chinese API producers supply a good part of the Indian market.” (footnote omitted));
WHO, INDIAN POLICIES TO PROMOTE LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS AND PROTECT
PUBLIC HEALTH 33 (2017), https://www.who.int/phi/publications/2081India020517.pdf (prepared by Frederick
Abbott) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“India and China are major competitors in the
pharmaceutical sector, and that competition is likely to intensify.”).
156. As my colleague Srividhya Ragavan declared emphatically:
[D]ata exclusivity as a tool detrimentally affects generic competition. Thus, it is no coincidence that
India has been pressurized by the [United States Trade Representative] to extend the existing 4 year
period of data exclusivity to 10 years. For countries like India, it is good to appreciate that generics
have become a part of the global pharmaceutical industry.
Srividhya Ragavan, Data Exclusivity: A Tool to Sustain Market Monopoly, 8 JINDAL GLOBAL L. REV. 241, 260
(2017) (footnote omitted); see also Ragavan, (Re)Newed Barrier, supra note 79, at 1188 (discussing the four
years of data exclusivity protection provided by Section 122E of the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940);
Srividhya Ragavan, The Significance of the Data Exclusivity and Its Impact on Generic Drugs, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. STUD. 131, 140 (2017) (arguing that “India has a perfectly fine data exclusivity provision” and does not
need to strengthen protection in this area); Prashant Reddy T., The Data Exclusivity Debate in India: Time for a
Rethink?, 10 INDIAN J.L. & TECH. 8, 17–25 (2014) (capturing the debate in India on the protection of
undisclosed test or other data for pharmaceutical and agrochemical products).
157. See Sudip Chaudhuri, Is Product Patent Protection Necessary to Spur Innovation in Developing
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closer to those of the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, the United States, and
other developed countries.158 This position shift has raised questions about the
ongoing negotiations at the WTO and WIPO. Will both China and India continue
to team up to push for standards that align with the positions of developing
countries? Or will the slowly changing pharmaceutical landscape cause these two
leaders of the developing world to slowly drift apart? If so, how can other
developing countries maintain an effective coalition to push for positions that are
more in line with their needs, interests, conditions, and priorities?
Although the multilateral system involving the WTO and WIPO has received
considerable scholarly and policy attention, the biggest tensions between China
and India over the development of regulatory standards in the pharmaceutical
arena will likely arise at the regional level.159 A case in point is the ongoing
negotiation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (“RCEP”),160
in which both China and India have played important roles.161 While the draft
RCEP intellectual property chapter has never been officially released,
Knowledge Ecology International—a nongovernmental organization active in the
health and intellectual property arenas—leaked online the October 15, 2015
Countries?: R&D by Indian Pharmaceutical Companies After TRIPS, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 265, 285–86 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009)
(discussing new drug-delivery systems in India); Dwijen Rangnekar, Context and Ambiguity in the Making of
Law: A Comment on Amending India’s Patent Act, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365, 379–80 (2007) (noting the
changing configuration of Indian pharmaceutical firms); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 1, at 390–91
(noting the dynamic development of the pharmaceutical sector in the BRICS countries).
158. See supra Part III (discussing the changing pharmaceutical landscape in China).
159. See generally Peter K. Yu, The RCEP Negotiations and Asian Intellectual Property Norm Setters, in
THE FUTURE OF ASIAN TRADE DEALS AND IP 85 (Liu Kung-Chung & Julien Chaisse eds., 2019) [hereinafter
Yu, Norm Setters] (discussing the rivalry between Asian intellectual property norm setters in the context of the
RCEP negotiations); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Battle to Define Asia’s Intellectual Property
Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331 (2018) (discussing the struggle between key RCEP
negotiating parties over intellectual property rules).
160. The RCEP negotiations have involved Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea,
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). See ASEAN Plus Six, Joint Declaration on the
Launch of Negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Nov. 20, 2012),
https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/negotiations/rcep/news/Documents/joint-declaration-on-the-launch-ofnegotiations-for-the-regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (launching the RCEP negotiations). In November 2019, India withdrew from the RCEP
negotiations. See Niranjan Marjani, India Had Good Reason to Pull Out of RCEP, DIPLOMAT (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/india-had-good-reason-to-pull-out-of-rcep/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review). Despite India’s lack of involvement in the latest negotiation efforts, nothing precludes the
country from rejoining the negotiations. See Kunal Purohit, India’s “Door Still Open” to RCEP Free-Trade
Deal: Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 15, 2020, 7:30 PM),
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3046231/indias-door-still-open-rcep-free-trade-deal-foreignminister (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
161. For the Author’s analysis of the RCEP, see generally Yu, Norm Setters, supra note 159; Peter K.
Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in GOVERNING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: REGULATORY DIVERGENCE AND
CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al. eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP
and the Future of Copyright Norm-setting in the Asian Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN
PACIFIC: JUXTAPOSING HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY 19 (Susan Corbett & Jessica C. Lai eds., 2018);
Yu, RCEP and Trans-Pacific Norms, supra note 89.
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version of that chapter.162 This draft chapter included a provision that requires
“no less than five years” of protection to undisclosed test or other data submitted
for the regulatory approval of pharmaceutical products.163 On that draft, the
language for a six-year term, which is in line with China’s WTO commitment,164
was specifically crossed out.165 In addition, that draft declined to offer protection
to biological products, providing a significant contrast with Article 18.51 of the
TPP Agreement.166
Thus, if in the near future China switched its position in the RCEP
negotiations to push for stronger protections for pharmaceutical and biological
products—a new position that is consistent with the recently proposed
amendments to Chinese patent law and pharmaceutical regulations167—India and
a few ASEAN members would become the lone holdouts within the sixteen
RCEP negotiating parties. As the leaked draft text revealed, Japan and South
Korea were the negotiating parties proposing the data exclusivity provision.168
Although Australia and New Zealand opposed such protection, both Australia
and New Zealand signed the TPP Agreement, suggesting their willingness to
accept high TPP-like standards for the protection of pharmaceutical and
biological products.169 If these three countries were to eventually join those
ASEAN members that have embraced stronger intellectual property protection
and enforcement, such as Singapore, China’s changing position will have serious
ramifications for future international and regional intellectual property
negotiations.
Finally, since fall 2013, China has been actively pushing for the development

162. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Intellectual Property Chapter (Oct. 15 draft),
http://keionline.org/sites/default/files/RCEP-IP-Chapter-15October2015.docx [hereinafter October 15 Draft] (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see also James Love, 2015 Oct 15 Version: RCEP IP
Chapter, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Apr. 19, 2016), http://keionline.org/node/2472 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing the leaked text).
163. October 15 Draft, supra note 162, art. 5.16.
164. WTO Accession Report, supra note 77, ¶ 284.
165. October 15 Draft, supra note 162, art. 5.16.
166. Compare id. with TPP Agreement, supra note 93, art. 18.51; see also Yu, Data Exclusivities, supra
note 78, at 680 (“[T]he draft RCEP chapter does not include any provision on biologics. The omission is
understandable considering the deep controversy surrounding the provision on biologics that arose toward the
end of the TPP negotiations.”).
167. See supra notes 74–85 (discussing the amendments).
168. October 15 Draft, supra note 162, art. 5.16.
169. Both Australia and New Zealand signed the TPP Agreement even though it offered at least eight
years of protection to undisclosed test or other data submitted for the regulatory approval of biological products.
See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trans-Pacific Partnership Ministers’ Statement
(Feb.
4,
2016),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/February/TPPMinisters-Statement (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting the signing of the TPP
Agreement in Auckland, New Zealand in February 2016). In November 2016, New Zealand also passed the
requisite bill to ratify the Agreement. See TPP Bill Signed by Parliament as US Signals Its End, RADIO N.Z.
(Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/political/318141/tpp-bill-signed-byparliament-as-us-signalsits-end (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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of the Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”).170 Although this initiative has thus far
focused on interconnectivity and infrastructural developments,171 there has been
growing developments in the intellectual property area.172 At the time of writing,
China has already hosted two high-level international conferences on BRI-related
intellectual property matters.173 In May 2017, the country also entered into the
Agreement on Enhancing “Belt and Road” Intellectual Property Cooperation
with WIPO.174 In addition, “over the past [few] years, China has carried out
extensive cooperation with [Belt and Road] countries in terms of [intellectual
property] education, publicity, training and information exchange.”175 Given the
important role the BRI can play in facilitating intellectual property
cooperation,176 China’s position in the pharmaceutical arena will likely have
serious ramifications for future intellectual property developments in the more
than sixty countries along the Belt and Road.

170. See NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N ET AL., VISION AND ACTIONS ON JOINTLY BUILDING SILK
ROAD ECONOMIC BELT AND 21ST-CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD (2015) (providing the official translation of
a guiding document for the development of this initiative).
171. See DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S FUTURE 162–63 (2016) (“[The BRI sought] to build
infrastructure and facilitate commercial ‘connectivity’ from northwestern China across Eurasia and from
southeast China to Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. Through [this and other] initiatives, China is
meticulously constructing an alternative and parallel global institutional architecture to the postwar western
order.”).
172. For discussions of the BRI in the intellectual property context, see generally Lee Jyh-an, The New
Silk Road to Global IP Landscape, in LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 417 (LutzChristian Wolff & Xi Chao eds., 2016); Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Infrastructure Along
China’s Belt and Road, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 281 (2019) [hereinafter Yu, Building IP Infrastructure]; Peter
K. Yu, China, “Belt and Road” and Intellectual Property Cooperation, 14 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 244
(2019).
173. See Press Release, CNIPA, The 2018 High-Level Conference on IP for Countries Along Belt and
Road Highlights Inclusiveness, Development, Cooperation, Mutual Benefit (Aug. 29, 2018),
http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/specialtopic/tbar2018/tbar2018headlines/1131331.htm (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review) (recounting the 2016 conference); Press Release, WIPO, High Level “Belt and
Road” Conference Urges Closer IP Collaboration for Economic Growth (July 27, 2016),
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2016/news_0008.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (recounting the 2016 conference).
174. Press Release, WIPO Director General Visits Belt and Road Forum and China Supreme People’s
Court (May 18, 2017), https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2017/news_0001.html (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
175. Li You, Intellectual Property in Focus at High-Level Forum in Beijing, CHINA DAILY (Aug. 29,
2018), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-08/29/content_36837702.htm (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review); see also id. (“In the past two years, China . . . signed memorandums of understanding
on [intellectual property] cooperation with a large number of countries including Tajikistan, Vietnam, Laos, the
Philippines, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Egypt.”).
176. In past scholarship, I explored how the BRI can promote intellectual property cooperation in six
distinct areas: “substantive standards, procedural arrangements, cross-border enforcement, dispute resolution,
technical cooperation, and market aggregation.” Yu, Building IP Infrastructure, supra note 172, at 278; see also
id. at 301–22 (discussing cooperation in these areas).
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V. CONCLUSION
In the past three decades, China has been slowly but actively building its
patent system. Having undergone multiple developmental phases—from
imitation to standardization to integration to indigenization177—the Chinese
patent system has arguably advanced much faster than any system that has ever
been built.178 In the past few years, China has also been actively strengthening its
position in the pharmaceutical arena. While the proposed changes to patent law
and pharmaceutical regulations provide good indications of what is to come in
the near future, China’s growing deployment of artificial intelligence and
machine learning in the health area also deserves scholarly and policy attention.
Given all of these developments, it is high time that policymakers and
commentators paid greater attention to China’s assertiveness in the
pharmaceutical arena and the changing domestic and global pharmaceutical
landscapes. Until policymakers and commentators foster a deeper understanding
of these changes and developments, they will have great difficulty formulating
appropriate regulatory and policy responses toward China.

177. See Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 51, at 1058–87 (discussing these four phases of
“imitation and transplantation,” “standardization and customization,” “integration and assimilation,” and
“indigenization and transformation”).
178. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 14, at 2 (“China . . . has accomplished what no other
country has ever achieved in such a short period of time—be it Germany, Japan or the United States. While it
took the now-developed countries centuries to establish their patent systems, the same feat took China only
three decades.”); Peter K. Yu, Trade Secret Hacking, Online Data Breaches, and China’s Cyberthreats, 2015
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 130, 139 (noting that China “has built a new intellectual property system from the
ground up faster than any other country in history”).
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